PUBLISHED
August 31, 2025
During the Biden administration, India rose from the status of an ordinary bilateral trade partner to the position of a “strategic partner” and “most favored nation” in the eyes of Washington. Biden’s White House envisioned India as a counterweight to China’s growing influence in Asia and beyond, pumping extraordinary political, economic, and strategic support into New Delhi. India was projected globally as the next manufacturing hub, replacing China, and US high-tech industries were encouraged to set up captive plants across India.
These industries were supposed to produce goods cheaply in India and bring them back to the US, granting India unprecedented access to American markets and raising its global geopolitical standing. The scale of respect, economic incentives, and military cooperation lavished on India was unprecedented and elevated its profile on the world stage. But this sudden elevation inflated India’s ego, making it more assertive, stubborn, and, at times, confrontational—not just toward its neighbors like Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, but even toward China and, eventually, its Western partners.
India began flexing its muscles globally, confident that Washington’s unwavering support would shield it from consequences. This newfound arrogance became visible during disputes with the European Union and the US itself, particularly after the Ukraine war began. European leaders, frustrated with India’s defiance over Russian oil imports, confronted New Delhi, but the Biden administration largely shielded India from repercussions.
Despite India openly bypassing sanctions, re-exporting discounted Russian oil, and profiting immensely, the Biden White House avoided imposing penalties. For Biden, the strategic calculus was clear: strengthen India’s economy, enhance its military capabilities, and project it as the leading democratic bulwark against China in the Indo-Pacific region. Even when India stubbornly refused to align with US and European sanctions against Russia, the administration remained lenient, keeping the long-term vision intact.
All this changed the moment Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025. Unlike Biden, Trump viewed the US–India relationship through a cold lens of transactional pragmatism, rejecting the notion of unconditional strategic indulgence. For Trump, India’s ballooning trade surplus with the US, its hidden tariff barriers, and its profitable energy trade with Russia represented a fundamental imbalance.
Within months, Trump reversed nearly all the “goodies” extended under Biden, replacing diplomatic pampering with economic leverage. He demanded that India halt Russian oil imports, end its practice of reselling refined Russian petroleum products to the US and Europe at inflated margins, and lower its prohibitive tariffs on American goods.
India’s refusal was immediate and absolute. Its leadership, still basking in the privileges earned during the Biden years, rejected US demands and defended its “strategic autonomy.”
Trump responded swiftly and decisively, beginning with a modest 10% tariff on Indian goods, then raising it to 15%, then 35%, and finally imposing an extraordinary 50% blanket tariff by August 27, 2025. This move effectively crippled India’s position in the US market, making a significant portion of its exports—worth approximately $48 to $58 billion annually—prohibitively expensive for American buyers. Key sectors like textiles, apparel, seafood, gems and jewelry, furniture, machinery, and metals were devastated, facing immediate order cancellations and revenue declines.
Analysts forecast that India could lose up to 43% of its US exports, equivalent to nearly $40 billion annually, with deep disruptions to its manufacturing base and employment market. These tariffs didn’t just reflect economic strategy; they symbolized a broader recalibration of US policy, reducing India from a privileged strategic partner back to the status of a transactional trading ally.
This rupture between Washington and New Delhi, though damaging for India, has created a golden opportunity for Pakistan. With India’s dominance in US supply chains disrupted, Pakistan stands uniquely positioned to step in and fill the gaps.
In 2024, Pakistan’s total trade with the US stood at around $7.2 billion, with exports accounting for roughly $5.1 billion and growing. During fiscal year 2024–25, Pakistan’s exports to the US climbed further to $5.83 billion, driven largely by textiles, apparel, leather products, surgical instruments, and home furnishings. Now, as American buyers seek alternatives to Indian suppliers affected by tariffs, Pakistan’s competitive advantages make it the natural beneficiary.
A weaker rupee against the dollar already renders Pakistani products cheaper and more attractive for the US market, especially when coupled with quality manufacturing capabilities in key sectors like textiles and surgical goods.
Adding further strength to Pakistan’s position is the July 2025 Pakistan-US Trade and Energy Deal, a landmark agreement reached just weeks before Trump announced the final 50% tariffs on India. This agreement included tariff reductions on Pakistan’s key exports—particularly textiles, leather, surgical instruments, agricultural goods, and IT services—giving Pakistani exporters a direct pricing edge over their Indian counterparts.
Moreover, Pakistan agreed to align itself closely with US policy goals, including observing restrictions on Russian oil imports and enhancing counterterrorism cooperation. Trump, pleased with Pakistan’s consistent support, publicly praised Islamabad’s role in regional stability, including its assistance in capturing high-profile terrorists and facilitating US intelligence operations. The agreement also paved the way for future American investment in Pakistan’s energy sector, signaling deeper economic cooperation.
Beyond trade policy, Pakistan’s standing with Washington has benefited from its responsible diplomacy. Unlike India, which openly defied US requests and doubled down on Russian oil purchases—reportedly worth $34 billion annually—Pakistan has avoided confrontation by abstaining from deals that would contravene Western sanctions.
Pakistan’s neutrality on contentious energy policies, combined with its strategic assistance in regional security matters, has made it a more trusted partner in Washington’s evolving Asia strategy. Furthermore, Pakistan’s close consultation with the US before its limited strikes on Iran and the unprecedented White House meeting between President Trump and Pakistan’s Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, demonstrate growing confidence between the two governments.
The confluence of these developments provides Pakistan with a historic opportunity. With Indian goods now priced out of competitiveness in the American market, US buyers will be urgently seeking substitutes for billions of dollars’ worth of textiles, jewelry, seafood, furniture, and machinery.
Pakistan can meet this demand by rapidly mobilizing its industrial base, investing in capacity expansion, and aggressively marketing its products. An organized, coordinated approach involving the government, private sector, exporters’ associations, and the Pakistani diaspora in the US could allow Pakistan to double, or even triple, its exports within the next few years.
Success in capturing these supply chains would not only strengthen Pakistan’s economy but also position it as a preferred South Asian partner for other Western economies, including the European Union, which often follows US trade patterns.
However, exploiting this opportunity requires swift, strategic action. Pakistan must identify the product categories previously dominated by Indian exporters and aggressively target those niches. It must incentivize new investments in high-demand industries, ensure international quality compliance, and improve supply chain reliability.
If executed effectively, Pakistan can fill the void created by India’s loss, gain sustained access to premium global markets, and strengthen its economic sovereignty.
In the shifting dynamics of South Asian trade, India’s arrogance, fostered by years of pampering under the Biden administration, has collided with Trump’s transactional economic realism, leaving it isolated and economically vulnerable. For Pakistan, however, this moment represents more than just a commercial opening—it is a strategic chance to redefine its economic relationship with the United States, elevate its global trade profile, and accelerate industrial growth.
The window is open, but it may not stay open for long. If Islamabad and its private sector move decisively, Pakistan could transform this disruption into a long-term opportunity, positioning itself as the primary South Asian beneficiary of the US market and rewriting the region’s economic map for years to come.
Qamar Bashir has served as the former Press Secretary to the President, Press Minister at Pakistan’s embassy in France and Press Attache to Malaysia
All facts and information are the sole responsibility of the author
